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Silent Trusts Are Trending:
Will They Hold Trustees to Account?
Kent D. Schenkel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A common intuition, perhaps amply supported by anecdotal evidence, is that easy money creates a disincentive to efforts for personal
success. Many trust settlors seem to embrace this view but still wish to
provide generously for their families. Enter the so-called "silent trust,"
which seeks to moderate the disincentive effect by way of trust provisions that limit or waive notice and disclosure requirements to
beneficiaries. 1
But a fundamental tension plagues these trusts. Beneficiaries need
basic information about a trust in order to hold trustees to account.
Consequently, traditional trust law provides limits on the degree to
2
which trustees can be silent as respects a beneficiary's right to know.
The Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") broadly adopts the traditional view,
while (perhaps grudgingly) conceding adopting states' preferences for
allowing trust settlors to opt out of certain information and accounting
provisions. 3 So the outer boundaries of silent trusts remain unsettled,
even across those jurisdictions that have adopted the UTC.
This short article first summarizes the status of the mandatory information and reporting rules under the UTC, and then takes a peek at
the legal principles on which cases interpreting silent trust provisions
stand. In so doing, it situates the silent trust in the context of the larger
academic debate about mandatory versus default provisions in trust law.
It finds that mandatory UTC provisions requiring a trustee to act in
good faith and giving courts the power to act in the interest of justice
can serve as sufficient safeguards to beneficiaries of silent trusts. None-

I

Boston.
* Professor of Law, New England Law
1 See, e.g., Jay A. Soled et al., Quiet Trusts: When Mum's the Word to Trust Benefi-

ciaries, EsT. PLAN., July 2013, at 13, 13-14; David A. Diamond et al., The Silent Trust:
Using State Statutes to Delay Notification of a Trust, TSWB03 A.L.I. 1 (2014) [hereinaf-

-

ter Diamond et al., The Silent Trust]; William R. Burford, What the Kids Don't Know
Deconstructing the 'Silent' Trust, SV024 A.L.I.-A.B.A 1, 4 (2014) [hereinafter Burford,
What the Kids Don't Know].
2 ALAN NEWMAN ET AL., BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(2021) [hereinafter BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES].

3 See infra Part II.
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theless, courts must interpret these provisions to permit beneficiaries,
upon request, to obtain from the trustee any information reasonably required to determine whether trustee wrongdoing has occurred.
II.

INFORMATION

AND

REPORTING

UNDER THE

UTC

According to one of the leading treatises on trust law,
"[a]ccountability of the trustee to the beneficiary" is "at the heart of
their fiduciary relationship." 4 It follows that, without accountability, no
trust relationship is formed. For this reason, it would seem that a trust
settlor would be unable to completely eliminate a trustee's obligation to
keep the trust beneficiary reasonably informed. To do so would in effect
strike a blow against trustee accountability and risk removing the trust
relationship from the purview of a court.5 But this does not mean that a
settlor cannot modify the extent to which a trustee must adhere to default rules mandating the provision of information to the beneficiaries.
If legislative moves by UTC adopting jurisdictions are any indication,
the settlor's ability to modify or waive information and reporting requirements is generally increasing. 6
The UTC's provisions requiring trustees to inform and report to
beneficiaries appear in section 813.7 Not all of the trustee's duties here
are affirmative; some can depend on whether a beneficiary has requested information concerning the trust.8 The duties can also vary depending upon whether the beneficiary in question enjoys the status of a
"qualified beneficiary," as defined by the code. 9 While the UTC's rules
are comprehensive, they do not uniformly settle the question across en4 BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,

supra note 2, § 965.

5 In cases where no allegations of wrongdoing have been made and the settlor has

chosen to waive the duty to account, some courts have declined to impose such a duty on
the trustee. See id. California has a statute that permits courts to enforce accountings
where settlors have waived them where there is "a showing that it is reasonably likely
that a material breach of the trust has occurred.. . ." CAL. PROB. CODE § 16064(a) (West
2021).
6 For current treatment of information and reporting requirements in UTC jurisdictions, see infra Appendix.
7 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 813(a) (UNW. L. COMM'N amended 2010).
8 Id. § 813(c).
9 See id. § 813(a)-(c). See also UNIF. TR. CODE § 103(3) (defining "beneficiary"). A
"qualified beneficiary" is defined as a beneficiary who, on the date at issue:
(A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; (B)
would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if
the interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on
that date without causing the trust to terminate; or (C) would be a distributee or
permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on
that date.
Id. § 103(13).
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acting jurisdictions as to a trustee's information reporting requirements.
This is because jurisdictions have not enacted section 105, relating to
mandatory and default rules, in the form presented by the UTC's Drafting Committee. 10
Given the fundamental nature of the trustee's accountability to the
beneficiary, one might surmise that trust law provisions requiring trustees to account and report to beneficiaries cannot be completely waived
by the settlor. But the UTC gives the settlor substantial control over the
scope of these obligations, and, depending upon whether or in what
modified form certain "bracketed" provisions of section 105 were
adopted by the state in question, a settlor may be at least theoretically
able to waive all information and reporting requirements. 1 These provisions regarding a trustee's information and reporting requirements are
referenced in sections 105(b)(8) and (9).12 Essentially, they provide that
a settlor cannot waive two types of duties contained in section 813. First
is the duty "to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who
have attained 25 years of age of the existence of the trust, of the identity
of the trustee, and of their right to request trustee's reports."1 3 Second is
the duty "to respond to the request of a [qualified] beneficiary of an
irrevocable trust for trustee's reports and other information reasonably
related to the administration of a trust."14
According to the comments, these provisions, which were placed in
brackets in 2004,15 "have generated more discussion in jurisdictions considering enactment of the UTC than have any other provisions of the
Code."1 6 Despite that the UTC's Drafting Committee takes the position
that the provisions should be enacted as presented, most enacting jurisdictions have modified or deleted them.1 7 Thus, even a general sense of
state law, which varies widely, cannot be discerned solely by reference
to the UTC.
Why have adopting states either deleted or modified the provisions
making certain information and disclosure requirements mandatory? It
would seem that trust settlors wish to retain the option to keep their
beneficiaries-perhaps fully but maybe only partially-in the dark.
Many settlors are doubtless concerned about the incentive-dampening
10 See infra Appendix.

11 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 105(b)(8)-(9) (placed in brackets to indicate their optional
status).
12 Id.
13 Id. § 105(b)(8).
14 Id. § 105(b)(9). The provision places the term "qualified" in brackets.
15 See id.
16

§

105 cmt.

Id.

17 See infra Appendix; see also BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,

supra note 2, § 965.
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effects of gifts in trust. Other concerns might be keeping information
about the trust from the beneficiaries' parents or relatives, and perhaps
that third parties who gain knowledge of the trust will impose on the
trust beneficiaries.1 8 A couple of comprehensive outlines prepared for
continuing legal education courses indicate that the call for these trusts
is strong, and that practitioners and trust departments are clearly
responding.19
III.

ARE SILENT TRUSTS FUNDAMENTALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
LAW OF TRUSTS?

Considerations of public policy have always been a hard brake on
trusts' terms. Cases implicating public policy might involve trust provisions creating restraints on marriage or investment decisions. 20 But silent trusts also raise fundamental issues. In the context of silent trusts,
the question is whether a settlor's seemingly paradoxical attempts to
benefit the beneficiary by restricting access to information is fundamentally incompatible with the very nature of the trust relationship. The
UTC has attempted to walk the fine line between yielding to the freedom of disposition of settlors and ensuring that beneficiaries have sufficient information to enforce the trustee's obligation. On the one hand is
the UTC's official view that section 105 should be enacted as presented,
which has been soundly rejected by enacting states. 2 1 On the other
hand, placing sections 105(8) and (9) in brackets is essentially a concession that at least some silent trust provisions are compatible with the
UTC's overall scheme.2 2
But must the specific duties of a trustee under sections 813(a),
(b)(2) and (3) be deemed mandatory in order to maintain the integrity
18 See Robert M. Brucken, Can Trusts Really be Secret?, PROB. L.J. OIo, Sept./Oct.
2015, at 22, 22.
19 See, e.g., Burford, What the Kids Don't Know, supra note 1, at 4; Diamond et al.,
The Silent Trust, supra note 1, at 1; Nicole K. Mann & Jane Zhao, Silent Trusts: "Three
Can Keep a Secret, if Two of Them are Dead", 1065 A.L.I. 1, 31 (2018) (stating that many

states have adopted statutes permitting silent trusts).
20 See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U.L. REv.
1105, 1109 (2004).
21 See infra Appendix.
22 The comments to the 2004 amendments make clear that "[t]he placing of these
provisions in brackets does not mean that the Drafting Committee recommends that an
enacting jurisdiction delete" the sections. To the contrary, the Drafting Committee "continues to believe that" enacting the sections "as is, represent[s] the best balance of competing policy considerations. Rather, the provisions were placed in brackets out of a
recognition that there is a lack of consensus on the extent to which a settlor ought to be
able to waive reporting to beneficiaries, and that there is little chance that the states will
enact sections 105(b)(8) and (b)(9) with any uniformity." UNiF. TR. CODE § 105 cmt.
(UNWF. L. CoMM'N 2010).
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of trusts? The answer seems to be no. After all, a trust created under the
UTC, even where those provisions have been made default, still maintains the accountability of the trustee to the beneficiary-the true heart
of the trust relationship. The mandatory rules of section 105 still include
"the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries," 2 3
and "the power of a court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as may be necessary in the interests of justice." 2 4 Further, courts
have been issuing rulings consistent with these principles for many
years, 25 and have stepped in to limit the extent to which settlors can
restrict the rights of beneficiaries to access information about trusts. 26
There seems to be general recognition among courts that if the withholding of information from the beneficiary creates an unacceptably
high risk of a breakdown in the enforcement of the trustee's fiduciary
obligations, then it threatens the efficacy of the trust. 27
A potential problem, however (and this was presumably a concern
of the UTC's Drafting Committee), is that courts in many of these cases
require evidence or some showing of fraud or other wrongdoing on the
part of the trustee in order for the beneficiaries to be entitled to the very
information that evidences that malfeasance. 28 One of the older cases
on this rule is Keller's Estate,29 decided in 1909 by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Here, no trust was involved, but the decedent in his will
left his estate for life to his wife, with remainder to his son, and named
both beneficiaries executors. Some years later, the surviving widow
died, followed several days later by the son. The widow's executors filed
suit against the son's estate, maintaining that the son had "converted all
the assets of [his father's] estate" 30 and demanded an accounting. But
the father's will had provided that "no inventory nor appraisement nor
account" was to be filed by the executors. 31
Despite that the plaintiffs alleged wrongdoing, the court upheld the
waiver of accounting in the father's will. It held that where "fraud" is
23 Id. § 105(b)(2).
24 Id. § 105(b)(13).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
26 See infra Part IV.

27 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts (comments on Clause (c) of § 29) gets at this
point when it praises the "flexibility" of the trust in permitting settlors to create interests
"individually tailored as the particular property owner deems best," but points out that
these "advantages" need to be "balanced against ...

the burdens a former owner's unre-

strained dispositions might place on courts to interpret and enforce individualized interests and conditions." RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. (AM. L. INST. 2003).
28 See BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 2, § 965.
29 73 A. 926, 926 (Pa. 1909).
30 Id.

31 Id. at 926-27.
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complained of, the court will order an accounting even where the will
waives it, "if ground be shown." 3 2 Here, the court said there was "not a
33
suggestion of fraud" even though the plaintiffs had alleged conversion.
The court seemed to think that to hold otherwise would have defeated
the intent of the testator to shield the estate from accountability to persons who weren't beneficiaries of the estate.
Another influential older case is Wood v. Honeyman, 34 an Oregon
decision involving a number of trusts, extensive facts, and a settlor's misplaced faith in his son-in-law, who served as successor trustee of the two
trusts at issue. The trust beneficiaries were able to amass considerable
evidence of malfeasance by the trustee and filed suit to remove him
from office and for an accounting, among other relief. In the trustee's
appeal of the trial court's judgment against him a major issue was
whether he should be required to account, despite that in at least one of
the trusts at issue, the settlor had waived that obligation in the trust
instrument. The Oregon Supreme court held that a settlor can relieve a
trustee of providing "formal accounts" to the beneficiary, but, when
called upon, must "show that he faithfully performed his duty" and ac3
count to "a court of equity." s
IV.

CAN THE LAw OF TRUSTS PREVENT A BENEFICIARY FROM
OBTAINING EVIDENCE OF A TRUSTEE's WRONGDOING?

How does a trust beneficiary who is concerned about possible
wrongdoing on the part of the trustee obtain evidence of same when the
trust provisions shield the trustee from providing trust accountings or
other information? The most interesting and compelling contemporary
case on this issue, and one that arose in the context of the UTC, is the
North Carolina decision of Wilson v. Wilson. 36 North Carolina had
adopted the UTC in 2006 but was one of the jurisdictions that completely left out sections 105(b)(8) and (9), making the accounting and
37
reporting requirements of section 813 default-only. In this case, the
settlor created trusts for his two children in 1992 containing language
relieving the trustee of any obligation "to prepare or file for approval
any inventory, appraisal or regular or periodic accounts or reports with
32 Id. at 927.
33 Id.

34 169 P.2d 131 (Or. 1946).
35 Id. at 166.
36 690 S.E.2d 710 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
37 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-105 (2021).
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any beneficiary . .. ".38 The beneficiaries filed suit against the trustee for
breach of fiduciary duty in 2007.39
The beneficiaries made a couple of fairly specific allegations. First
they alleged that the trustee had permitted the settlor to "take control"
of trust assets and invest those assets in "highly speculative" business
4 0
Second, they
ventures resulting in their "substantial depreciation."
maintained that the trustee "breached his statutory duty by failing to
distribute income to Plaintiffs as required by the terms of the Trust Instruments." 4 1 The trustees refused to respond to discovery requests, citing the silent trust provisions referred to above, and went so far as to file
a motion for a protective order, stating that "by reason of the provisions
42
of the Trust Instrument, the discovery sought herein may not be had."
The trial court granted the motion and also entered a partial declaratory
judgment, citing legislative commentary with respect to North Carolina's version of UTC section 813, and stating that a trustee "may override, or negate the requirement of disclosure" to beneficiaries by a
provision in the trust instrument.4 3 The beneficiaries appealed both
issues.44
In its review, the appeals court emphasized up front that non-waivable provisions of the UTC require a trustee to act in good faith and in
the interests of the beneficiaries and recognize the court's power to take
action in the interest of justice.45 This despite that the North Carolina
statute "omitted those portions of the Uniform Trust Code that would
require the trustee to keep qualified beneficiaries reasonably informed
about the trust administration." 4 6 The case turned on the court's view
that the mandatory good faith requirement, coupled with the court's
power to act in the interest of justice, means that beneficiaries are always entitled to information "reasonably necessary to enforce their
rights under the trust," and that such information "could not be legally
47
withheld, notwithstanding the terms of the trust instrument."
The decision in Wilson seems right, even though it dilutes the settlor's right to limit information shared with the beneficiaries. Any alternative would seem to prevent beneficiaries from holding the trustee
accountable in any case except that in which sufficient evidence of mal38 Wilson, 690 S.E.2d at 711.
39 Id.
40
41

Id.
Id.

42 Id. at 712.

Id.
See id.
45 See id. at 714.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 716.
43
44
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feasance could be gathered without a trustee accounting. And to so hold
would be to ignore the principles of good faith and trustee accountability to the courts-principles necessarily baked into the law of trusts.48
But the dissent in Wilson, written by Judge Elmore, seemed unconcerned about this dilemma. 49 It noted that the beneficiaries could not
prove their case without information the settlor legally chose to withhold from them and that therefore summary judgment in favor of the
trustees should be granted. 50
Quite a number of jurisdictions seem to have case law that, at least
pre-UTC, is in accord with the decision in Wilson, at least where fraud
or wrongdoing is evident. 51 But a potential problem remains where evidence of any alleged wrongdoing cannot be obtained because silent trust
provisions prevent the beneficiaries from gathering basic information
about the trust. For example, a relatively recent Mississippi case interprets the effect of a direction in a trust document to waive an accounting
where the jurisdiction's version of the UTC permits waiver. 52 Mississippi adopted the UTC in 2014.53 The jurisdiction retained sections
105(b)(8) and (9),54 but added a provision that gives the settlor a great
deal of flexibility in, for example, specifying a different age for
mandatory notification of a beneficiary under section 813(b) or
designating a surrogate to receive notice to the beneficiary. 55 In the case
of Estate of Fuller v. Kelly, a trust instrument provided that the trustee
was not "required to account to any court." 56 Citing Mississippi's version of UTC section 105(a), the court held that the provision waiving
accounting was "enforceable under Mississippi law" absent "some evidence of mismanagement or fraud." 5 7 In so ruling, the court followed
58
a
the Mississippi Supreme Court case of In re Estate of Baumgardner,
case decided in 2012 (before the state's adoption of the UTC), indicating that the Mississippi UTC's provisions did not really change the law
in the state as to whether a waiver of accounting was effective. 59 It is,
See BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 2, § 965.
49 See Wilson v. Wilson, 690 S.E.2d 710, 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (Elmore, J.,
48

dissenting).
50 Id. at 719 (Elmore, J., dissenting).

51 See, e.g., Briggs v. Crowley, 224 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Mass. 1967); In re Childress
Trust, 486 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Killeen v. Chico, 328 S.E.2d 184, 186
(W. Va. 1985).
52 Estate of Fuller v. Kelly, 203 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
53 S.B. 2727, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014).
54 MIsS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-105(b)(8)-(9) (2021.).
55 Id. § 91-8-105(d)(2)-(3).
56 Estate of Fuller, 203 So. 3d at 1148.

57 Id. at 1149.
58 82 So. 3d 592 (Miss. 2012).
59 See id. at 604-05.
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and the court will enforce it, except that "evidence of mismanagement
or fraud in the record could warrant an accounting even in the presence
of an explicit waiver." 60 But as stated above, acquiring such evidence
can be a problem where silent trust provisions restrict access to it. So it
remains to be seen whether other courts will pick up on the sound reasoning of North Carolina's Wilson case-the UPC's mandatory good
faith requirement, coupled with the court's power to act in the interest
of justice, means that beneficiaries are always entitled to information
"reasonably necessary to enforce their rights under the trust." 61
V.

THE MANDATORY VERSUS DEFAULT DEBATE

Restrictions in the UTC on the withholding of information from
trust beneficiaries are not anti-dead hand rules in that they do not attempt to defeat a settlor's intent. 62 Instead, they have as their purpose
the preservation of the very vehicle by which the settlor has chosen to
make the gift in question. This is not a paternalistic or condescending
move-these rules are not protecting the settlor from an inability to
"understand" the consequences of the actions taken. 63 In any given instance it may well be more likely that the settlor, rather than any legislature or court, is in the best position to assess the potential benefit or
detriment to the beneficiary of withholding information. Further, only
the settlor can determine his own individual tolerance level for the risk
that a more lightly-monitored trustee will fall short of its obligations.
But, in order for the trust relationship to reliably function, there must be
an unimpeachable protection mechanism, and the core ingredient in
that relationship-the "without which not"-is the accountability of the
trustee to the trust beneficiary. Eliminating the beneficiary's access to
information puts this essential element of a trust at risk, and the courts
must determine trust law's tolerance for the appropriate level of that
risk. The consequence to the donor is that a failure to follow trust law
rules means that trust law protections will not follow.
60 Id. at 605 (quoting In re Stubbs-Kelley Trust, 573 So. 2d 734, 736 (Miss. 1990)).
61 Wilson v. Wilson, 690 S.E.2d 710, 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
62 See Langbein, supra note 20, at 1119-20.

63 The situation may be different in the event a settlor attempts to eliminate all
fiduciary duties. Langbein puts it thus:
The concern is I may not understand that, by eliminating all fiduciary duties, I

am effectively making T, rather than B, the donee. By forbidding me from eliminating all fiduciary duties, the rule protects me and my intended beneficiary
(whether T or B) by requiring me to make my transfer in a forthright manner.

Id.

at 1123.
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CONCLUSION

Donors do not gift property in trust to enrich trustees, or to limit
the consequences to the trustee of either the mismanagement of trust
property or the failure to respond to the legitimate needs of trust beneficiaries. Even where silent trust provisions are used, settlors gift property
in trust to maximize the benefit to the beneficiaries of those gifts. Restrictions settlors may place on the use of trust property (limiting access
until certain ages, inserting spendthrift provisions, conditioning distributions on educational incentives, and reducing trustee information and
reporting requirements) are almost always meant, in the eye of the settlor, to increase the property's benefit to the beneficiaries. The genius of
a trust lies in the settlor's almost unlimited freedom to craft the beneficial interest in ways the settlor deems will achieve this goal. And American trust law gives extraordinarily wide latitude in the calibration of this
interest.
Silent trusts offer one of the latest challenges in holding together
the fundamentals of the trust relationship while ensuring that the device
can change in response to demands of trust settlors and their advisors.
There is an ongoing academic debate about mandatory versus default
provisions in trust law.64 While most arguments in favor of mandatory
rules focus on the property rights of trust beneficiaries, default-only
rules generally favor rights of settlors. Silent trusts sit squarely in the
center of this debate, and their trajectory provides insight into the direction trust law is taking. Settlors are increasing their control over trusts,
and yet the UPC and many courts have thus far maintained certain important checks on that control. Trustees are obligated to act in good
faith in the interests of trust beneficiaries and courts have the power to
act in the interest of justice. 65 An essential open question in many jurisdictions is whether courts will enforce silent trust provisions in cases
where they threaten to prevent beneficiaries from obtaining evidence of
fraud or other wrongdoing on the part of trustees.

64 Compare Langbein, supra note 20, at 1105 (stating that mandatory trust rules
include some "intent-defeating rules" that "serve an anti-dead-hand policy" and are nec-

essary to ensure that trusts "benefit the beneficiaries"), with Jeffrey A. Cooper, Shades of
Gray: Applying the Benefit-the-Beneficiaries Rule to Trust Investment Directives, 90 B.U.

L. REV. 2383, 2384 (2010) (disagreeing with Professor Langbein's view on the "benefitthe-beneficiaries" rule).
65 UNiF. TR. CODE § 105(b)(2) (UNrF. L. COMM'N amended 2010).
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APPENDIX

Jurisdiction
1. Alabama

Citation
ALA. CODE § 193B-105(b)(8)
(2021)

Notes
In Alabama only "the duty .. . to
respond to the request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable
trust for trustee's reports and other information reasonably related
to the administration of a trust" is

mandatory.
2. Arizona

ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-

In Arizona only "[t]he duty to
respond to the request of a quali-

10105(B)(8) (2021) fied beneficiary of an irrevocable
trust for trustee's reports and oth-

3. Arkansas
4. Colorado

er information reasonably related
to the administration of a trust" is
mandatory.
ARK. CODE ANN. In Arkansas both provisions were
§ 28-73-105 (2021) omitted.
COLO. REV. STAT. Colorado mandates the duty "to
§ 15-5-105(2)(h)- provide notice of the existence of
(i) (2021)

an irrevocable trust, of the identi-

ty of the trustee, and of the right
to request trustee's reports to current distributees or permissible
distributees of such trust at any
age, or to other qualified beneficiaries of such trust who have attained twenty-five years of age,"
and the duty "to respond to the

request of a qualified beneficiary
of an irrevocable trust for trustee's
reports and other information reasonably related to the administra-

5. Connecticut

tion of a trust."
CONN. GEN. STAT. Connecticut's statute permits noti§ 45a-499e(b)(7)
fication to a "designated repre(2021)
sentative of [a] qualified beneficiary" in lieu of notice to the qualified beneficiary.

[Vol. 47:107
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Jurisdiction
6. The District of
Columbia

Citation
D.C. CODE § 191301.05(c)(1)
(2021)

7. Florida

FLA. STAT.
§ 736.0105(r)-(t)
(2021)

8. Hawaii

S.B. 385, 31st Leg.
(Haw. 2021),
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ -105 (effective
Jan. 1, 2022)
Illinois modifies the mandatory
760 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. 3/105 (2021) provisions and makes them prospective only.

9. Illinois

10. Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.

Notes
The District of Columbia has added provisions to the statute that
give the settlor the power to
"waive or modify" notice, information and reporting requirements under certain circumstances.
Florida has modified the UTC
provisions but generally mandates
comprehensive duties of notice
and reports to qualified beneficiaries.
Hawaii largely retains the mandatory UTC language but does not
restrict notification to qualified
beneficiaries over age 25.

Kansas omits both subsections.

§ 58a-105 (2021)
11. Kentucky

12. Maine

13. Maryland

KY. REV. STAT.

Kentucky permits the designation

of a surrogate to receive reports.
ANN. § 386B.1030(j) (West 2021)
ME. STAT. tit. 18, Maine permits the designation of
§ 105(3)(B) (2021) surrogates to receive information
and reports.
Maryland largely retains the UPC
MD. CODE ANN.,
language.
EST. & TRUSTS
§ 14.5-105 (West
2021)

14. Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 203E, § 105
(2021)

Massachusetts omits the provi-

sions.
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Jurisdiction
15. Michigan

SILENT TRUSTS

Citation
MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.

§ 700.7105(2)(i)
(West 2021)

119

Notes
Michigan reduces the mandatory
requirements to a duty "to provide beneficiaries with the terms
of the trust and information about
the trust's property, and to notify
qualified trust beneficiaries of an
irrevocable trust of the existence

of the trust and the identity of the
trustee."
16. Minnesota

MINN. STAT.

Minnesota omits the provisions.

§ 501C.0105 (2021)
17. Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-8-105(d)(2)(3) (2021)

Mississippi modifies the provisions by permitting a different age
to be designated and permitting
surrogates to receive information

and reports.
18. Missouri

19. Montana

MO. REV. STAT.

Missouri permits a settlor to limit

§ 456.1-105(3)
(2021)

information and reporting requirements to certain "permissible
distributees."

MONT. CODE

Montana omits the provisions.

ANN. § 72-38-105
(2021)
20. Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT.

Nebraska mandates a requirement

§ 30-3805(b)(8)

"to keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration
of the trust and of the material

(2021)

facts necessary for them to protect

21. New
Hampshire
22. New Jersey

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564-B:1105 (2021)
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3B:31-5(b)(7)
(2021)

their interests, and to respond to
the request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for
trustee's reports and other information reasonably related to the
administration of a trust."
New Hampshire omits the provisions.
New Jersey only provides mandatory rights to qualified beneficiaries 35 years of age or older.
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23. New Mexico
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Notes
Citation
New Mexico mandates the UTC
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 46A-1-105 (2021) provisions except with respect to a
trustee that is a "regulated financial service institution" and also

mandates that the settlor "[be]
informed of the risks and conse-

quences of the waiver." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813(F).
24. North

N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 36C-1-105 (2021)
Carolina
25. North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 59-09-05 (2021)
OHIO REV. CODE
26. Ohio
ANN. § 5801.04
(B)(14)(C) (West
2021)
OR. REV. STAT.
27. Oregon
§ 130.020(4)(b)
(2021)

North Carolina omits the provi-

sions.
North Dakota omits the provisions.
Ohio permits surrogates to receive
"notices, information, or reports
otherwise required" under the
UTC's provisions.
Oregon permits surrogates to receive "notice, information or reports" to qualified beneficiaries.

20 PA. CONS.

Pennsylvania currently omits UTC

STAT. § 7705
(2021)

§ 105(b)(9).

29. South

S.C. CODE ANN.

South Carolina omits the provi-

Carolina

§ 62-7-105 (2021)

sions.

30. Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN.

Tennessee omits the provisions.

28. Pennsylvania

§ 35-15-105 (2021)
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 75-7-105 (West

Utah omits the provisions.
-

31. Utah

2021)
32. Vermont

33. Virginia
34. West Virginia
35. Wisconsin
36. Wyoming

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. Vermont omits the provisions.

14A, § 105 (2021)
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-703 (2021)
W. VA. CODE
§ 44D-1-105 (2021)
WIS. STAT.
701.0105 (2021)
WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-105 (2021)

Virginia omits the provisions.
West Virginia omits the provisions.
Wisconsin omits the provisions.

§

Wyoming omits the provisions.

